I read with interest an
article published on the voceu.org website of the CEPR – Center for Economic
and Policy Research. The piece, entitled Charitable giving: War-time evidence
from Ukraine’s war fundraising, addresses a rarely discussed topic: the
financing of the war in Ukraine from the perspective of volunteerism. The
authors argue that, in addition to public support, there is another significant
source of funding, namely private donations (Klymak et al., 2025). By analyzing
daily data, the study links donation trends to particularly dramatic events in
the conflict, such as targeted attacks, civilian casualties, or other tragedies
(Havadzyn & Kritsak, 2022). The starting hypothesis is that, in the days
immediately following such events, there is a tangible increase in economic
solidarity towards Ukraine.
According to the collected
data, not only are tax revenues and public resources increasingly directed to
the Ukrainian cause, but individual donations also play a significant role
(Khoma, 2023). To give an idea of scale, a single organization has raised about
500 million dollars to support Ukraine’s military expenses. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that, considering the multitude of active organizations
and platforms, the total figure is much higher (Budraitis, 2025).
The authors connect this
phenomenon to patterns observed in the past following natural disasters or
health emergencies, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or epidemics. In such cases,
intense media coverage and the immediate emotional impact have historically
generated peaks in generosity. Applying the same model to Ukraine, the study
finds that a one-percent increase in civilian casualties in a single day
corresponds to a rise in daily donations ranging from 547 to 756 dollars, at
least according to data from May 2025 (Klymak et al., 2025). Furthermore, each
additional civilian victim generates on average 5,184 dollars in direct
donations which, when added to other indirect contributions, amount to about
8,169 dollars—a sum which, as the authors note, is enough to fund a
reconnaissance drone.
The peak in donations usually
occurs three days after the tragic event and then gradually declines. However,
since casualties continue to increase, the fundraising cycle tends to repeat
consistently. The role of the media is crucial in this mechanism. The study
shows that a one-percent increase in media mentions related to the conflict is
associated with an estimated eight million dollar increase in donations (HELMUS
& Holynska, 2024). The most severe episodes, such as the bombing of a
hospital or direct violence against civilians, are even more effective in
triggering a widespread sense of injustice and, therefore, in mobilizing funds.
From a policy perspective, these
findings also highlight the importance of clear legal frameworks for managing
donations and ensuring transparency and accountability (Teremetskyi et al.,
2023). According to the authors, these findings have significant policy
implications. Generally, governments finance wars with their own resources,
sometimes by issuing bonds. But the Ukrainian case shows that private
contributions can represent an important complement (Ragauskas, 2025). For this
reason, it would be necessary to examine more carefully the relationship
between government support and citizen support. Hence the need to ensure
transparency in the management of donations, to allow anonymity for
contributors, to establish clear reporting systems, and to ensure
accountability in the allocation of funds (Pshenychna & Skyba, 2018). The
authors emphasize that donations cannot replace the state’s commitment, but
they can significantly supplement it, especially if the issue remains central
in the media agenda (Fischmann & Xu, 2024). The data show that this flow of
funds is not purely symbolic, but is actually used in concrete frontline
operations, including strategic purchases.
However, the model has some
weaknesses. Maintaining a steady flow of donations depends on keeping the
conflict at the center of public debate. This requires substantial media
investment, involving constant coverage, on-the-ground reporting, and
narratives that convey the human reality of the war (Зражевська &
Безчотнікова, 2024). Without this direct storytelling, the emotional drive that
fuels donations tends to weaken (Park et al., 2024). Yet here an inevitable
problem arises: over time, emotional saturation sets in (Zelče, 2024). In
prolonged conflicts lasting years, the population becomes accustomed to news of
destruction and death. What initially provokes indignation and mobilization is
perceived as routine, and the effectiveness of the humanitarian appeal declines
sharply.
This mechanism is different
from what is seen in natural disasters, which, being sudden and short-lived,
generate a peak of attention and support concentrated over a limited period. In
a long war, to counteract habituation, it is necessary to periodically renew
narrative models and to consider the possibility of structural declines in
donations (Fischmann & Xu, 2024). It would be interesting to know, as the
author of the analysis suggests, whether there is a saturation point beyond
which the willingness to donate collapses precisely because of the
normalization of violence.
Another issue raised concerns
the unequal distribution of media attention and, consequently, of donations.
The war in Ukraine receives much greater coverage and support than other
conflicts or humanitarian tragedies (Ji et al., 2024), such as those in Africa
or the Middle East, which often find no place in the Western media agenda. The
geographic proximity of Ukraine to countries such as Germany, Poland, and
Romania, and the perception of a direct threat by millions of Europeans, helps
explain this imbalance, but it is not a sufficient justification.
In this context, the role of
the media becomes central. They are responsible for providing a broader and
less selective view of the world, one that is not limited to the most famous or
politically relevant cases for the West (Lujan, 2025). In the United States,
for example, its position of global leadership requires attention to a wider
range of international issues. In Europe, and especially in Italy, this breadth
of vision seems to have narrowed. Interest is focused mainly on the war in
Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while wars, crises, and tensions
in Africa, Asia, or other regions remain largely ignored, even when Italian
economic interests are at stake, as in the case of ENI.
The same goes for crucial
issues such as the South China Sea dispute or the situation in Taiwan, which
are rarely discussed in the national debate. To this is added a widespread
tendency in Italy to interpret international relations through a simplified
lens, that of “empires.” According to this narrative, the world is populated by
monolithic entities such as the Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or American empires.
This interpretation, often promoted by commentators invoking geopolitics,
depicts the empire as an inherently intolerant structure naturally inclined to
war. However, this representation is not universal: in the Anglo-Saxon
political and media debate, for example, it is rare to speak of Russia or China
as empires in the strict sense.
This vision intersects with
another conceptual limitation, that linked to the improper use of geopolitics.
Geopolitics assigns greater value to territory than to people, international
cooperation, and diplomatic relations. If applied rigidly, it legitimizes the
idea that each portion of land should belong exclusively to a particular
ethnicity or nation, turning territorial possession into an absolute principle.
This approach, in practice, fuels a logic of permanent conflict. Geopolitics is
certainly useful for military strategic planning, but when it becomes the
primary frame of reference for international political action, it risks being
misleading and justifying wars for control over land. We should reflect deeply
on the consequences of these ideas, which are now so widespread. Both the
vision of the world as a mosaic of empires and the rigidly geopolitical
interpretation are based on partial knowledge of global economic, industrial,
and political dynamics. They are conceptual shortcuts that oversimplify an
increasingly complex reality.
As more populations emerge
from poverty, the international landscape becomes more fragmented and
complicated. This has happened with China and is happening with India, albeit
with enormous difficulties. China’s per capita income is around ten thousand
euros, while India’s is about 2,600 dollars: raising one and a half billion
people to Chinese income levels would be an immense challenge. Even the
countries labeled as “empires” face structural problems. China, though
economically strong today, will have to contend with a drastic demographic decline.
Russia, sooner or later, will face the need to renew its ruling class. Iran,
large and resource-rich, could be a regional economic power comparable to
Germany, but remains marginalized due to internal political choices.
If the European public, and
the Italian public in particular, is to continue actively supporting
international causes, including donation campaigns, it is necessary to provide
a broader and more complex account of the world, one that goes beyond the
simplistic reduction to clashes between empires or exclusively geopolitical
interpretations of events (Ji et al., 2024; Lujan, 2025). Only in this way will
it be possible to keep attention alive and to foster conscious and lasting
participation.
References
Budraitis, D. (2025). Policy Innovations Amid Crisis: How the War in
Ukraine is Shaping Humanitarian Aid Strategies.
Fischmann, A., & Xu, L. Z. (2024). Emotion regulation and cheap talk
as signaling strategies: Evidence from crowdfunding for
Ukraine. Telematics and Informatics, 87, 102086.
Havadzyn, N., & Kritsak, Y. (2022). Fundraising in war-time
conditions. Prychornomorski Ekonomichni Studii, 74, 182-186.
HELMUS, T. C., & HOLYNSKA, K. (2024). Ukrainian Resistance to
Russian Disinformation.
Ji, D., Jiang, X., & Wang, L. (2024). Domesticating international
news: China's media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. International
Communication Gazette, 86(1), 55-72.
Khoma, N. (2023). Crowdfunding and fundraising in the peacebuilding
system: Ukraine’s case. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 20(1),
53-75.
Klymak, M., Kosenko, A., Korenok, O., Mykhailyshyna, D., & Vasilaky,
K. (2025). Charitable giving in wartime: evidence from Ukraine’s war
fundraising.
Lujan, F. M. (2025). Mixed Messages: Ukraine and the Limits of
Russia and China's" No Limits" Partnership in the Information
Space (Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).
Park, G., Chung, J., & Lee, S. (2024). Scope and limits of AI
fundraisers: Moderated serial multiple mediation model between artificial
emotions and willingness to donate via humanness and
empathy. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 201, 123211.
Pshenychna, L., & Skyba, O. (2018). Management in Ukraine: Stages of
Formation, Development, Types. TEM Journal, 7(3), 582.
Ragauskas, R. (2025). The asymmetry of war support: Evidence from
private donations to Ukraine. Conflict Management and Peace Science,
07388942251322437.
Teremetskyi, V., Korol, V., Nebyltsova, O., Burylo, Y., &
Pryianchuk, I. (2023). Taxation of Charitable Giving in Terms of Martial Law in
Ukraine: Legislative Novelties and Future Models.
Zelče, V. (2024). Media and Society, 2023: Proceedings of Scientific
Papers= Mediji un sabiedrība, 2023: Rakstu krājums.
Зражевська, Н. І., & Безчотнікова, С. (2024). Ukrainian
medialandscape in the time of war (2022–2024): transformation, response to the
war, dynamics of media consumption. Інтегровані комунікації, (2 (18)),
6-14.
https://www.spreaker.com/episode/angelo-leogrande-le-donazioni-finanziarie-a-sostegno-dell-ucraina--67322668
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