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Donazioni private, influenza dei media e sfide politiche nel finanziamento della guerra in Ucraina

 

I read with interest an article published on the voceu.org website of the CEPR – Center for Economic and Policy Research. The piece, entitled Charitable giving: War-time evidence from Ukraine’s war fundraising, addresses a rarely discussed topic: the financing of the war in Ukraine from the perspective of volunteerism. The authors argue that, in addition to public support, there is another significant source of funding, namely private donations (Klymak et al., 2025). By analyzing daily data, the study links donation trends to particularly dramatic events in the conflict, such as targeted attacks, civilian casualties, or other tragedies (Havadzyn & Kritsak, 2022). The starting hypothesis is that, in the days immediately following such events, there is a tangible increase in economic solidarity towards Ukraine.

According to the collected data, not only are tax revenues and public resources increasingly directed to the Ukrainian cause, but individual donations also play a significant role (Khoma, 2023). To give an idea of scale, a single organization has raised about 500 million dollars to support Ukraine’s military expenses. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, considering the multitude of active organizations and platforms, the total figure is much higher (Budraitis, 2025).

The authors connect this phenomenon to patterns observed in the past following natural disasters or health emergencies, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or epidemics. In such cases, intense media coverage and the immediate emotional impact have historically generated peaks in generosity. Applying the same model to Ukraine, the study finds that a one-percent increase in civilian casualties in a single day corresponds to a rise in daily donations ranging from 547 to 756 dollars, at least according to data from May 2025 (Klymak et al., 2025). Furthermore, each additional civilian victim generates on average 5,184 dollars in direct donations which, when added to other indirect contributions, amount to about 8,169 dollars—a sum which, as the authors note, is enough to fund a reconnaissance drone.

The peak in donations usually occurs three days after the tragic event and then gradually declines. However, since casualties continue to increase, the fundraising cycle tends to repeat consistently. The role of the media is crucial in this mechanism. The study shows that a one-percent increase in media mentions related to the conflict is associated with an estimated eight million dollar increase in donations (HELMUS & Holynska, 2024). The most severe episodes, such as the bombing of a hospital or direct violence against civilians, are even more effective in triggering a widespread sense of injustice and, therefore, in mobilizing funds.

From a policy perspective, these findings also highlight the importance of clear legal frameworks for managing donations and ensuring transparency and accountability (Teremetskyi et al., 2023). According to the authors, these findings have significant policy implications. Generally, governments finance wars with their own resources, sometimes by issuing bonds. But the Ukrainian case shows that private contributions can represent an important complement (Ragauskas, 2025). For this reason, it would be necessary to examine more carefully the relationship between government support and citizen support. Hence the need to ensure transparency in the management of donations, to allow anonymity for contributors, to establish clear reporting systems, and to ensure accountability in the allocation of funds (Pshenychna & Skyba, 2018). The authors emphasize that donations cannot replace the state’s commitment, but they can significantly supplement it, especially if the issue remains central in the media agenda (Fischmann & Xu, 2024). The data show that this flow of funds is not purely symbolic, but is actually used in concrete frontline operations, including strategic purchases.

However, the model has some weaknesses. Maintaining a steady flow of donations depends on keeping the conflict at the center of public debate. This requires substantial media investment, involving constant coverage, on-the-ground reporting, and narratives that convey the human reality of the war (Зражевська & Безчотнікова, 2024). Without this direct storytelling, the emotional drive that fuels donations tends to weaken (Park et al., 2024). Yet here an inevitable problem arises: over time, emotional saturation sets in (Zelče, 2024). In prolonged conflicts lasting years, the population becomes accustomed to news of destruction and death. What initially provokes indignation and mobilization is perceived as routine, and the effectiveness of the humanitarian appeal declines sharply.

This mechanism is different from what is seen in natural disasters, which, being sudden and short-lived, generate a peak of attention and support concentrated over a limited period. In a long war, to counteract habituation, it is necessary to periodically renew narrative models and to consider the possibility of structural declines in donations (Fischmann & Xu, 2024). It would be interesting to know, as the author of the analysis suggests, whether there is a saturation point beyond which the willingness to donate collapses precisely because of the normalization of violence.

Another issue raised concerns the unequal distribution of media attention and, consequently, of donations. The war in Ukraine receives much greater coverage and support than other conflicts or humanitarian tragedies (Ji et al., 2024), such as those in Africa or the Middle East, which often find no place in the Western media agenda. The geographic proximity of Ukraine to countries such as Germany, Poland, and Romania, and the perception of a direct threat by millions of Europeans, helps explain this imbalance, but it is not a sufficient justification.

In this context, the role of the media becomes central. They are responsible for providing a broader and less selective view of the world, one that is not limited to the most famous or politically relevant cases for the West (Lujan, 2025). In the United States, for example, its position of global leadership requires attention to a wider range of international issues. In Europe, and especially in Italy, this breadth of vision seems to have narrowed. Interest is focused mainly on the war in Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while wars, crises, and tensions in Africa, Asia, or other regions remain largely ignored, even when Italian economic interests are at stake, as in the case of ENI.

The same goes for crucial issues such as the South China Sea dispute or the situation in Taiwan, which are rarely discussed in the national debate. To this is added a widespread tendency in Italy to interpret international relations through a simplified lens, that of “empires.” According to this narrative, the world is populated by monolithic entities such as the Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or American empires. This interpretation, often promoted by commentators invoking geopolitics, depicts the empire as an inherently intolerant structure naturally inclined to war. However, this representation is not universal: in the Anglo-Saxon political and media debate, for example, it is rare to speak of Russia or China as empires in the strict sense.

This vision intersects with another conceptual limitation, that linked to the improper use of geopolitics. Geopolitics assigns greater value to territory than to people, international cooperation, and diplomatic relations. If applied rigidly, it legitimizes the idea that each portion of land should belong exclusively to a particular ethnicity or nation, turning territorial possession into an absolute principle. This approach, in practice, fuels a logic of permanent conflict. Geopolitics is certainly useful for military strategic planning, but when it becomes the primary frame of reference for international political action, it risks being misleading and justifying wars for control over land. We should reflect deeply on the consequences of these ideas, which are now so widespread. Both the vision of the world as a mosaic of empires and the rigidly geopolitical interpretation are based on partial knowledge of global economic, industrial, and political dynamics. They are conceptual shortcuts that oversimplify an increasingly complex reality.

As more populations emerge from poverty, the international landscape becomes more fragmented and complicated. This has happened with China and is happening with India, albeit with enormous difficulties. China’s per capita income is around ten thousand euros, while India’s is about 2,600 dollars: raising one and a half billion people to Chinese income levels would be an immense challenge. Even the countries labeled as “empires” face structural problems. China, though economically strong today, will have to contend with a drastic demographic decline. Russia, sooner or later, will face the need to renew its ruling class. Iran, large and resource-rich, could be a regional economic power comparable to Germany, but remains marginalized due to internal political choices.

If the European public, and the Italian public in particular, is to continue actively supporting international causes, including donation campaigns, it is necessary to provide a broader and more complex account of the world, one that goes beyond the simplistic reduction to clashes between empires or exclusively geopolitical interpretations of events (Ji et al., 2024; Lujan, 2025). Only in this way will it be possible to keep attention alive and to foster conscious and lasting participation.

 

 

References

 

 

Budraitis, D. (2025). Policy Innovations Amid Crisis: How the War in Ukraine is Shaping Humanitarian Aid Strategies.

 

Fischmann, A., & Xu, L. Z. (2024). Emotion regulation and cheap talk as signaling strategies: Evidence from crowdfunding for Ukraine. Telematics and Informatics, 87, 102086.

 

Havadzyn, N., & Kritsak, Y. (2022). Fundraising in war-time conditions. Prychornomorski Ekonomichni Studii, 74, 182-186.

 

HELMUS, T. C., & HOLYNSKA, K. (2024). Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation.

 

Ji, D., Jiang, X., & Wang, L. (2024). Domesticating international news: China's media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. International Communication Gazette, 86(1), 55-72.

 

Khoma, N. (2023). Crowdfunding and fundraising in the peacebuilding system: Ukraine’s case. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 20(1), 53-75.

 

Klymak, M., Kosenko, A., Korenok, O., Mykhailyshyna, D., & Vasilaky, K. (2025). Charitable giving in wartime: evidence from Ukraine’s war fundraising.

 

Lujan, F. M. (2025). Mixed Messages: Ukraine and the Limits of Russia and China's" No Limits" Partnership in the Information Space (Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).

 

Park, G., Chung, J., & Lee, S. (2024). Scope and limits of AI fundraisers: Moderated serial multiple mediation model between artificial emotions and willingness to donate via humanness and empathy. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 201, 123211.

 

Pshenychna, L., & Skyba, O. (2018). Management in Ukraine: Stages of Formation, Development, Types. TEM Journal, 7(3), 582.

 

Ragauskas, R. (2025). The asymmetry of war support: Evidence from private donations to Ukraine. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 07388942251322437.

 

Teremetskyi, V., Korol, V., Nebyltsova, O., Burylo, Y., & Pryianchuk, I. (2023). Taxation of Charitable Giving in Terms of Martial Law in Ukraine: Legislative Novelties and Future Models.

 

Zelče, V. (2024). Media and Society, 2023: Proceedings of Scientific Papers= Mediji un sabiedrība, 2023: Rakstu krājums.

 

Зражевська, Н. І., & Безчотнікова, С. (2024). Ukrainian medialandscape in the time of war (2022–2024): transformation, response to the war, dynamics of media consumption. Інтегровані комунікації, (2 (18)), 6-14.



https://www.spreaker.com/episode/angelo-leogrande-le-donazioni-finanziarie-a-sostegno-dell-ucraina--67322668

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